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Pursuant

to

Rule

35

of

the Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, defendants/appellees, Mark 0. Van Wagoner and Kathryn
Van Wagoner, by and through their counsel of record, hereby
petition the Court for a rehearing in the above-captioned matter
following the Court's Opinion of March 27, 1992.l

This petition

is based upon points of law and fact which the Court overlooked
or misapprehended in its Opinion.

X.

PETITION SUMMARY.

Defendants request a rehearing on the grounds that:

1.

Rather than review the trial court's Findings of

Fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the Court engaged in
selective fact finding of its own.

2.

The Court reviewed the trial court's Conclusions

of Law by a standard not in place the time of the trial court's
judgment or, alternatively, the Court created a new undesirable
standard for unilateral mistake which supplants the Utah Supreme
Court's standard.

1

A true and correct copy of the Court's March 27, 1992,
Opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
1

3.

The

Court

created

a

new,

undesirable

legal

standard for reliance

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT HAS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION
ENGAGING IN A FUNCTION RESERVED FOR THE TRIAL COURT.

BY

The Court's Opinion states that the plaintiff did not
"dispute the trial court's finding of fact."2

While it is true

that plaintiff made no attempt to muster evidence from the record
to support a challenge to the Findings of Fact, plaintiff could
not challenge the trial court's legal conclusion regarding
unilateral mistake, without challenging the facts. For example,
the plaintiff could not leave the trial court's Finding of Fact
No. 30 which states, in pertinent part:

In the course of negotiations between the
defendant and Carol Klas, there existed the
Devere Kent appraisal valuing the property
at $165,000, the existence of which was
unknown to defendants, and if known, would
have made a material difference in their
offer to buy the subject property. This was
a unilateral mistake on the part of
defendants
which
was
fundamental
and
substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal was
never provided by Carol Klas in spite of
defendants'
requests
for
copies
of
appraisals.

2

Curiously, the Court's Opinion acknowledges a challenge to
the Findings of Fact in its footnote on page 3.
2

Plaintiff also had to challenge the trial court's Finding of
Fact No, 31 which statesf in pertinent part:

The defendants considered the price of
$175,000 as being a reasonable price for the
property in question at the time the offer
to purchase was submitted and executed by
them, based upon the representations made by
Carol Klas and without the benefit of the
Devere Kent appraisal.

(A true and correct copy of the trial court's Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") .

Nowhere in plaintiff's brief, or in the Court's Opinion, is
there an indication that the trial court's Findings of Fact Nos.
30 and 31 are clearly erroneous.

Indeed, as defendant's brief

points out, there is ample evidence in the record to support
those Findings as well as the other findings supporting the
judgment.

(See Appendix "A" to Brief of Appellees at pages Il-

ls, attached hereto as Exhibit "C").

A.

The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact Are Unchallenged.

According to the Court's Opinion, "Essentially, plaintiff
does not dispute the trial court's Findings of

Fact, but

challenges the trial court's application of the doctrine of
unilateral mistake."

(Exhibit "A" at p. 4 ) .
3

That being the

case, the Court should have accepted the trial court's Findings
of Fact as valid and reviewed the trial courtfs Conclusions of
Law based upon those Findings of Fact.

,f

If the appellant fails

to marshall the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to
review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law in the case." Crouse v. Crouse, 817
P. 2d 836 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P. 2d
198, 199 (Utah 1991).

B.

Ignoring The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact, The
Court's Opinion Creates New Findings Of Fact.

Rather than review the evidence which supported the trial
court's

Findings

of

Fcict, the

Court's

selective fact finding of its own.

Opinion

engages

in

For example, as indicated

above, the trial court's Finding of Fact Nos. 30 and 31 indicate
that defendants relied on the representations made by Carol Klas
with regard to the value of the property cind that the existence
of the appraisal not disclosed by plaintiff's representative
would have made a material difference to defendants.

In short,

the trial court found that the non-disclosure of the Kent
appraisal was fundamental and substantial to the underlying
contract.

Of course, the Court's Opinion points out that

plaintiff does not challenge these Findings of Fact.
4

Nonetheless, the Court's Opinion ignores the trial court's
Findings of Fact and imposes its own finding:

Because defendants, after arms length
negotiations with plaintiff, agreed to
purchase the property for a price within the
range set by plaintiff, we conclude that
defendants' ignorance of the existence of
the Kent appraisal valuing the property at
$165,000 would not render the enforcement of
the agreement unconscionable. (Exhibit "A"
at p. 7).

Here, the Court finds that the existence of the Kent
appraisal was immaterial.

Yet the trial court found that the

existence of the Kent appraisal was "fundamental and substantial"
and "would have made a material difference in [defendants'] offer
to buy the subject property."

(Exhibit "B" at Finding of Fact

No. 30) . The Court's Opinion does not indicate the trial court's
Finding of Fact was clearly erroneous, the Opinion simply issues
a different finding of fact.

The trial court's Findings of Fact also indicate that

In the course of defendants' contact with
Carol Klas, prior to August 11, 1987,
references were made to the effect that she
understood "appraisals" have been made in
the range of $175,000 to $192,000.
(Exhibit "B" at p. 4, Finding of Fact No.
7).

5

The Court's Opinion takes issue with this Finding of Fact
and states "it is clear from the record that both Carol Klas and
Mark Van Wagoner understood the range of those appraisals to
begin at $170,000, not at $175,000."

(Exhibit "A" at p. 3, n.3).

Under the proper standard for review, the Court1s Opinion should
have reviewed the record in order to determine if there was any
evidence in the record which supported the trial court's Finding
of Fact.

Absent such support, the Court could have found that

the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous.

In this case,

however, the record clearly contains evidence which supports the
trial courtfs Finding of Fact No. 7.

The testimony of Kathryn

Van Wagoner indicates that the appraisal range from $175,000 to
the low $190,000 area.

(Transcript Vol. II, at p. 148, 1. 15-25,

p. 149, 1. 1-12) (see Exhibit "C" at p. 5) .3

The trial court

found Ms. Van Wagonerfs testimony credible and compelling and
made its Finding of Fact accordingly.

This Court's conclusion

that this Finding of Fact is clearly erroneous cannot be based on
a lack of evidentiary foundation in the record, it must be the
product of the Court's judgment of the credibility and weight
afforded the evidence. This function is reserved for the finder
of fact, in this case, the trial court.
3

Although plaintiff failed to marshall the evidence in
regard to this Finding of Fact, Appendix A to the brief of
appellees (Exhibit "C" herein) is an annotation of the trial
court's Amended Findings of Fact.
The annotation cites to
testimony in the record which supports the trial court's Findings
of Fact.
6

A third point where the Courtfs Opinion substitutes its
judgment regarding a Finding of Fact for that of the trial court
is found on page 8, footnote 7 of the Court's Opinion. There the
Court states:

In light of our conclusion that both parties
understand the appraisals to range from
$175,000 and up, we likewise to do not
consider the $5,000 difference between the
Kent appraisal and the lowest of the three
informal appraisal to be an unconscionable
difference.
(Exhibit at p. 8) (Emphasis
added).

Here the Court has displaced the trial court's Finding of
Fact that the existence of the "Devere Kent appraisal valuing the
property at $165,000 . . . was unknown to defendants, and if
known, would have made a material difference in their offer to
buy the subject property."

(Exhibit

f, M

B at p 10).

The function of the trial court is to hear the relevant
testimony, weigh that testimony and then resolve conflicts and
make inferences necessary to reach supportable findings of fact.
By contrast, the function of the Appellate Court is limited to
determining

whether

any

evidence

(or

inferences

therefrom)

support the trial court1s Findings. By disregarding the clearly
erroneous standard, this Court exceeded its jurisdiction and
deprived

the trial

court

of

its essential
7

function.

"In

determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, due regard is
given to the trial court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses
since it is not [the Court of Appeals1] function to determine
conflicting

evidence

or

the

reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom."

State v. Ford, 818 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ut. Ct. App.

1991).

The proper inquiry on the appellate courtfs part is whether
there is any evidence in the record which supports the trial
court's Finding of Fact, not whether there is evidence in the
record which could support a different finding of fact. Id. ("We
do not assess facts de novo on appeal.11)

Given that both the

plaintiff and the Court have admitted that there is no challenge
to the facts, this case should be reheard based on the facts
found by the trial court.

III. THE COURT'S OPINION RETROACTIVELY APPLIES A NEW STANDARD FOR
UNILATERAL MISTAKE OR CREATES A NEW STANDARD WHICH SUPPLANTS
THE STANDARD SET BUY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.

The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law with regard to unilateral mistake

in May of 1990.

Accordingly, the trial court applied the standard for unilateral
mistake set forth in Guardian State Bank v. F. C. Stanql, 778
P.2d 1 (Utah 1989).

In Stanql, the Supreme Court agreed with,

8

and

adopted,

Professor

Corbin's

formulation

of the

law of

unilateral mistake:

There is particularly universal agreement
that, if the material mistake of one party
was caused by the other, either purposely or
innocently, or was known to him, or was of
such a character and accompanied by such
circumstances that he has reason to know of
it, the mistaken party has a right to
rescission. (Emphasis added).

Guardian State Bank v, F.C. Stanal, 778 P.2d at 12.

Following the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Stanal. the trial court concluded that:

(1) The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their
understanding that the lowest existing
appraisal on the property was $175,000.
(2) Their mistake was caused by their
misunderstanding of the representations made
by Carol Klas, and the failure to have the
Devere Kent appraisal provided in a timely
manner.
(3) The
mistake
was
substantial
and
fundamental to the proposed agreement
between the defendants and plaintiff.
If
the Van Wagoners had been aware of the
undisclosed, lower appraisal, it would have
made a material difference in their offer to
buy the property. (Exhibit MB" at p. 11).

9

Though charitable to plaintiff, the language of the trial court's
Conclusions

of Law

follows the Supreme Court standard

for

unilateral mistake as set forth in Stangl.

A.

The Court*8 Opinion Ignores The Stanal Standard And
Retroactively Applies Its Own Standard,

The standard for unilateral mistake as set forth in Stangl
has not been overruled, yet the Court's Opinion applies a more
restrictive standard set forth in Grahn v. Gregory* 800 P.2d 320
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) .
problems.

The application of Grahn creates two

First, it wrongly places the burden upon the trial

court's Conclusions of Law to meet a standard which did not even
exist until

five months after the trial court made those

conclusions of law based on Stangl.

Certainly, the trial court

did not err in applying the standards set forth in Stangl.

B.

The Court's Opinion Purports To Overrule Stangl.

The second problem created by this Court's application of
Grahn is that it holds the Stangl standard to be insufficient,
thus, findings following Stangl do not sustain a unilateral
mistake judgment.

If that is the Court's position, it should be

made sufficiently clear to afford the parties and courts of this
State appropriate guidance and opportunity for review.
10

In either event, Appellees1 respectfully suggest a rehearing
is appropriate to clarify the record•

IV.

BY CREATING MEW FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING DEFENDANTS1
RELIANCE, THE COURT'S OPINION MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD FOR
UNILATERAL MISTAKE.

Even if the Court should hold the trial court1s Conclusions
of Law to the more restrictive Grahn standard, the Court's
Opinion improper selective fact finding misapplies the standard
for unilateral mistake.

The Court's Opinion on unilateral

mistake focuses on two of the four criteria for unilateral
mistake under Grahn: unconscionability and diligence. Under both
theories, the Court's Opinion centers on the reasonableness of
defendants' reliance on the misrepresentations of plaintiff's
agent.

A.

Defendants' Reliance Was Justified and Plaintiff's
Misrepresentation Makes Enforcement of the Agreement
Unconscionable.

Unless this Court admits finding different facts, it must
base its conclusion of unconscionability on the facts found by
the trial court, namely:

1) the existence of the Kent Appraisal

was significant; 2) defendants lack of knowledge regarding the
existence of the appraisal was material; 3) that plaintiff knew
of the appraisal; and 4) that Carol Klas failed to disclose it.
11

These facts compel a legal conclusion of unilateral mistake, as
found by the trial court.

If these Findings of Fact are not

clearly erroneous, the trial courts judgment should stand.

B.

The Court's Opinion Creates An Unreasonable Standard
For A Buyer's Diligence,

By contrast, the Courtfs Opinion states that defendants
should

not have relied

upon the statements of plaintiff's

representative, a neighbor of the Van Wagoners, but should have
obtained an appraisal on the underlying property themselves.
(Exhibit "A" at p. 9).

Again, this Court ignored the trial court's findings that
Carol Klas failed to inform defendants that the property had been
appraised at a value as low as $165,000, a fact which she knew4
and which, if known to defendants, would have made a substantial
difference to them in entering into this contract.

The Court's

new facts set a standard that a buyer cannot rely on a statement
made

by

a

seller, without

further

acts

by

the

buyer

to

independently test the seller's representations. That standard
effectively eliminates reliance.

4

Transcript, Vol. II, at p. 130, 1. 8-23; see Exhibit "C"
at pages 4-5 re: Finding of Fact No. 5.
12

C*

The Court's Opinion Ignores Kathryn Van Wagoner's
Reliance,

1.

Kathryn Van Wagoner Is A Separate Individual
Party.

The Court's Opinion indicates that defendant should not have
elied upon the representations of plaintiff's agent because Mark
an Wagoner is an attorney with experience in real estate
latters.

(Exhibit "A" at p. 9). The Opinion, however, ignores

he issue of the reasonableness of Kathryn Van Wagoner's reliance
n the statements of plaintiff's agent*

As indicated above, it

as Kathryn Van Wagoner, a non-lawyer, who testified as to Carol
las' representations regarding the value of the property.
Exhibit "C" at p. 5 ) .

Kathryn Van Wagoner has an identity separate and apart from
hat of Mark Van Wagoner.

She is named as an individual

efendant in this matter and has defenses and counterclaims which
hough similar, are separate from those of Mark Van Wagoner. The
:ourt's Opinion directs its comments regarding the expertise and
experience of the buyer towards Mark Van Wagoner.

It completely

gnores Kathryn Van Wagoner as if she did not exist apart from
ter husband.

13

2.

Imputed Knowledge Should Be Applied Consistently
To Both Parties.

If the Court intends to transfer Mr. Van Wagoner1s status as
an attorney to Mrs. Van Wagoner, it also should transfer Mr.
Klas1 knowledge as a mortgage banker to Mrs. Klas. Indeed, it is
grossly inequitable to state that Kathryn Van Wagoner, as the
spouse of an attorney, is assumed to have the knowledge of an
attorney, but that Carol Klas, the former spouse of a mortgage
banker, is a layperson and has no idea what the term "appraisal"
means.

All defendants seek is the equal application of the

principal of imputed knowledge.

If the knowledge of Mark Van

Wagoner as an attorney is imputed to Kathryn Van Wagoner, the
knowledge of John Klas as mortgage banker must be imputed to
Carol Klas.

3.

Acting As A Unit, Plaintiff
Deceived Defendants.

And

Carol

Klas

John Klas, a mortgage banker, clearly understood the term
"appraisal" and the distinction between an appraisal and an
opinion of value. Loans are not granted based on opinions. When
John Klas discussed with Carol Klas of the range of "appraisals"
for the home, they both knew about Kent appraisal. Nonetheless,
the price was established based on a range of opinions which
ignored the only appraisal the Klases obtained.
14

Taken together, the actions of John and Carol Klas evidence
more than a seller setting a price range for his property and his
agent misconstruing the term "appraisal".

This only could have

been a plan to withhold the only true appraisal of the property
from prospective buyers, even in the face of the Van Wagoners'
direct, specific inquiry.

V.

CONCLUSION.

For

the

reasons

stated

above, defendants

respectfully

request a rehearing.

DATED this *zUr

day of April, 1992.

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
Lewis T. Stevens
Alexander H. Walker III
Kristin G. Brewer
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EXHIBIT A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00
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OPINION
(For Publication)

John H. K l a s ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 900493-CA

v.
Mark O. Van Wagoner and
Kathryn Van Wagoner,

FILED
(March 27, 1992)

Defendants and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Attorneys:

Brant H. Wall and Cory R. Wall, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Lewis T. Stevens, Alexander H. Walker, and Kristin G.
Brewer, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
ORME, Judge:
Plaintiff, John H. Klas, appeals from the trial court's
ruling entitling defendants to rescission of an Earnest Money
Sales Agreement, challenging the trial court's determination that
the defendants made a unilateral mistake. Defendants also seek
clarification on the issue of damages and attorney fees on
appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
This matter was tried to the court on May 9, 10, and 12 of
1989.
The court thereafter rendered its Memorandum Decision
concluding that defendants had breached the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement and that plaintiff was entitled to damages, interest,
costs, and attorney fees. After a period of almost one year of
objections, motions for new trial, and conflicting proposals for
findings, conclusions, and judgment by both sides, the trial
court entered a judgment allowing defendants to rescind the

subject agreement on the basis of unilateral mistake by the
defendants.1
Inasmuch as there is no serious dispute concerning the
findings of fact, the essential facts are taken from the lower
court's findings.
In July of 1987, defendants, Mark 0. Van Wagoner and his
wife, Kathryn Van Wagoner, attended an "open house" held by Carol
Klas, the former wife of plaintiff, John Klas. Carol Klas had
undertaken to sell the subject property, which was owned by
plaintiff pursuant to a Divorce Decree that awarded the property
to plaintiff as his sole and separate property. The Divorce
Decree provided that if, prior to September 1, 1987, Carol Klas
could find a buyer willing to purchase the property at a price
and upon terms acceptable to plaintiff, she would receive a
finder's fee of 3% of the gross sale price. Following the open
house, defendants expressed interest in purchasing the property.
In August of 1987, Mark Van Wagoner, who is an attorney,
prepared and delivered to Carol Klas an Earnest Money Sales
Agreement (the Agreement) wherein defendants offered to purchase
the property for $175,000. The Agreement included an integration
clause and specified that the offer was subject to no
contingencies, exceptions, or conditions of sale other than what
was set forth in the Agreement.2 Carol then presented the offer
to plaintiff.
Upon receiving the Agreement, plaintiff reviewed the written
proposal with his attorney. Plaintiff's attorney then telephoned
Mark Van Wagoner to review the document. At this time the
parties discussed and made modifications to the Agreement.
Plaintiff then executed the Agreement and delivered it to Mark's
office. Defendants signed the document on August 11, 1987, and
the parties agreed to a September closing date.
Prior to the August 1987 signing of the Agreement,
defendants inquired of Carol Klas about appraisals of the
property. Carol expressed to defendants her understanding that
1. There followed additional objections to the Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment, together with motions to amend the
same. On May 31, 1990, the court entered its Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law which clarified factual issues, but
resulted in the same legal conclusion as the March 13, 1990
Judgment.
2. A provision conditioning the contract upon buyers' obtaining
financing was expressly deleted.

900493-CA
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several "appraisals" had been made and that they ranged from
$170,000 to $192,000.3 The trial court found that there was an
apparent misunderstanding between defendants and Carol regarding
the term "appraisals." While defendants understood the term to
mean formal, written appraisals, Carol's testimony indicates that
she considered any opinion, whether verbal or written, given as
to the value of the property to be an "appraisal," The
appraisals to which Carol referred later proved to be informal
opinions as to the market value of the property solicited by
plaintiff from several personal acquaintances in the real estate
business. One of these was in letter form; the others were
merely verbal.
At no time prior to their signing the Agreement did
defendants request that plaintiff produce written appraisals of
the property, although, as indicated, they mistakenly assumed the
"appraisals" referred to by Carol Klas were formal, written
appraisals.4 Only after signing the Agreement did defendants
affirmatively demand copies of the appraisals to which Carol had
referred. Plaintiff was at first unresponsive, but after
learning that an appraiser engaged by defendants' prospective
lender had valued the property at $137,000, plaintiff provided
defendant with a copy of a fourth "appraisal," and the only
formal written appraisal, prepared for plaintiff.
That appraisal, prepared by Devere Kent, valued the property
at $165,000 but was older than the other "appraisals" referred to
by Carol Klas. It had been prepared earlier in connection with a
loan application made by plaintiff, prior to the divorce and
plaintiff's decision to sell. Throughout the course of
3. Plaintiff questions the trial court's finding that the three
appraisals to which Carol Klas referred ranged from $175,000 to
$192,000. It is clear from the record that both Carol Klas and
Mark Van Wagoner understood the range of those appraisals to
begin at $170,000, not $175,000. Thus, we conclude that the
trial court's finding that the three appraisals ranged from
$175,000 and up was clearly erroneous. Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d
545, 547 (Utah App. 1989).
4. "Appraisal" may have a different, more precise connotation in
contemporary real estate parlance. However, Carol Klas was not a
real estate agent or broker. In general usage, appraisal means
"an act of estimating or evaluating . . . especially] by someone
fitted to judge"; "a valuation of property by the estimate of an
authorized person." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 105
(198 6). The three "appraisals" Carol had in mind were estimates
furnished by Larry Payne, Howard Badger, and Vic Ayers, all of
whom were in the real estate or mortgage lending business.

900493-CA
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negotiations with Carol Klas, defendants were unaware of the
existence of this appraisal, and believed that the lowest
appraisal referred to by Carol was the lowest existing appraisal
of the property.
In early October of 1987 defendants, through their counsel,
notified plaintiff of the withdrawal of their offer to purchase
the property and demanded the return of the earnest money
deposit. Plaintiff then notified defendants that if they failed
to consummate the purchase of the property within ten days, the
property would be placed on the market in an effort to mitigate
damages and that defendants would be responsible for any damages
sustained. Defendants failed to finalize the purchase of the
property, and plaintiff thereafter placed the property on the
market. The property was sold in April of 1988, for $160,000,
and plaintiff sued defendants to recover the difference between
the Agreement price and the fair market value.
At trial, defendants basc>d their refusal to consummate the
purchase of the subject property upon the fact that, if known,
the Kent appraisal would have made a material difference in their
offer to buy the subject property. Defendants claimed this was a
unilateral mistake on their part entitling them to rescission of
the Agreement. Eventually, the trial court agreed with
defendants, and concluded that the unilateral mistake provided a
basis for rescission of the Agreement. Accordingly, the court
held that no damages were recoverable by plaintiff, and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint. The court also dismissed defendants'
counterclaim requesting relief on the grounds of fraud, mutual
mistake of fact, and detrimental reliance.5 Plaintiff appealed,
challenging the trial court's application of the law in
permitting rescission of the Agreement on the basis of unilateral
mistake.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Essentially, plaintiff does not dispute the trial court's
findings of fact, but challenges the trial court's application of
the doctrine of unilateral mistake. The issue before us, then,
is whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusion that
defendants were entitled to rescission of the Agreement on the
basis of unilateral mistake. "If a trial court interprets a
contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction no
5. Defendants sought an award of punitive damages, costs, and
attorney fees on their claims for fraud and detrimental reliance,
and sought cancellation or rescission of the Agreement as relief
on their claim for mutual mistake.
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particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness
standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
Accord 50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989); Copper State Leasing
Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah
1988) . Moreover, the trial court/s legal conclusions "are
accorded no particular deference; we review them for
correctness." Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991)
(quoting Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989)) .
UNILATERAL MISTAKE
This court has identified four criteria that must be
satisfied before rescission on the basis of unilateral mistake
will be permitted:
1. The mistake must be of so grave a
consequence that to enforce the contract
as actually made would be unconscionable.
2. The matter as to which the mistake
was made must relate to a material
feature of the contract.
3. Generally the mistake must have
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of
ordinary diligence by the party making
the mistake.
4. It must be possible to give relief by
way of rescission without serious
prejudice to the other party except the
loss of his bargain. In other words, it
must be possible to put him in status
quo.
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah App. 1990). See
generally Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah
1989) (discussing evolution of doctrine of unilateral mistake).
In applying these factors to the trial courts findings of fact,
we conclude that at least two of the four elements required to
sustain the trial court's rescission of the Agreement have not
been met.
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A. Unconscionability
First, we are not convinced that the alleged mistake was so
grave as to render enforcement of the Agreement as made
unconscionable- Concerning unconscionability, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated that "a duly executed written contract should be
overturned only by clear and convincing evidence." Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
1043 (Utah 1985). In determining unconscionability, "a court
must assess the circumstances of each particular case in light of
the twofold purpose of the doctrine, prevention of oppression and
of unfair surprise." Id. at 1041. Courts analyze
unconscionability in terms of "procedural" and "substantive"
unconscionability. Id.
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the "relative
positions of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the contract." Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 39
(Utah App. 1988) (quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v., Huth. 664 P. 2d
455, 461 (Utah 1983)). Procedural unconscionability occurs
"where there is an absence of meaningful choice and where lack of
education or sophistication results in no opportunity to
understand the terms of the agreement." Johnson, 761 P.2d at 39.
Substantive unconscionability occurs when contract terms are "so5
lopsided as to unfairly oppress or surprise an innocent party,"
id. at 40, or where there is "an overall imbalance in rights and
responsibilities imposed by the contract, excessive price or a
significant cost-price disparity, or terms which are inconsistent
with accepted mores of commercial practice." Id.
In the instant case, defendants' alleged mistake as to the
value of the property did not result from any procedural
unconscionability. The trial court's findings show that the
parties dealt at arms length. Defendant Mark Van Wagoner, an
attorney, testified at trial that he was experienced in real
estate transactions and that he had participated in many closing
transactions with real estate agents.6 Prior to signing the
Agreement, defendants engaged in discussions with Carol Klas
regarding the value of the home, fully aware that she was
financially interested in effecting a sale. Defendants were
informed by Carol that plaintiff would only accept an offer
within the range of the three appraisals to which she had
referred—from $170,000 to $192,000—and only if there were no
exceptions, contingencies, or conditions attached thereto.
Defendants assented to those terms, and tendered a form of
6. There was also testimony presented at trial that Mark had
previously owned a home in the neighborhood where the subject
property is located, and that he lived there until 1985.
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agreement of their own choosing. It is apparent that both
parties were essentially in equal bargaining positions, and that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Agreement were
not oppressive. Thus, any surprise on defendants' part was not
unfair.
Similarly, the terms of the Agreement were not "so lopsided
as to unfairly oppress or surprise an innocent party." Id. The
Utah Supreme Court has stated that
sellers and buyers should be able to
contract on their own terms without the
indulgence of paternalism by the courts
in the alleviation of one side or another
from the effects of a poor bargain. They
should be permitted to enter into
contracts that may actually be
unreasonable or which may lead to
hardship on one side.
Park Valley Corp. v. Baglev, 635 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1981). In the
instant case, both parties bargained for and clearly understood
the terms of the Agreement. Prior to preparing the Agreement,
defendants were advised by Carol Klas that plaintiff would not
approve of any exceptions or conditions to the Agreement, nor any
offer lower than the range of appraisals referred to by Carol.
The Agreement signed by both parties contained a notation that no
special considerations or contingencies existed relative to the
written Agreement. Accordingly, there was no provision in the
Agreement conditioning the purchase upon production of any
written appraisals by plaintiff or of the property appraising at
any particular value. The parties freely bargained for these
terms and assented to them by executing the Agreement.
The Agreement's price of $175,000 fell within the range of
informal appraisals valuing the subject property from $170,000 to
$192,000. The record indicates that plaintiff relied on a
variety of factors, including the three informal appraisals, to
determine the value of his property. These factors formed the
basis for his asking price, as well as his acceptance of
defendants' offer. Under the rationale stated in Baglev,
plaintiff was entitled to formulate the sales price of his home
in the manner of his choice, just as defendants were entitled to
base their offer on their own opinion of the value of the
property. Because defendants, after arm's-length negotiations
with plaintiff, agreed to purchase the property for a price
within the range set by plaintiff, we conclude that defendants'
ignorance of the existence of the Kent appraisal valuing the
property at $165,000 would not render enforcement of the
Agreement unconscionable.
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In addition, we conclude that, even considering the Kent
appraisal, the sales price was not itself unconscionable. First,
the $10,000 difference between the Kent appraisal, valuing the
property at $165,000, and defendants' offer of $175,000 can
hardly be termed "grave" or "unconscionable."7 Second, the trial
court specifically found that defendants considered their
offering price of $175,000 to be reasonable. Third, despite its
conclusion that rescission was proper on the basis of unilateral
mistake, the trial court made no finding suggesting that the
difference between the sale price and the Kent appraisal
constituted grave circumstances such that enforcement of the
Agreement would be unconscionable. Finally, we note that
defendants have cited no authority, nor set forth a persuasive
argument, to support their conclusion that the difference between
the sale price and the Kent appraisal constituted grave
circumstances sufficient to render enforcement of the Agreement
unconscionable. For these reasons, we conclude that the
consequence of defendants' alleged mistake was not so grave as to
render enforcement of the Agreement unconscionable.
B. Buyer's Diligence
Jumping to the third element necessary to sustain rescission
on the ground of unilateral mistake, we find that defendants'
conduct did not rise to the level of ordinary diligence required
to rescind a contract on the basis of unilateral mistake. In the
course of negotiations between the parties prior to signing the
Agreement, defendants were aware of the existence of three
"appraisals" valuing the subject property. While defendants did
not know that these "appraisals" were only informal expressions
of opinion, they did know that plaintiff would not entertain an
offer below the lowest of the quoted figures. However, the trial
court found that during these negotiations, defendants made no
attempt to secure an independent appraisal on the subject
property. Defendants contend that their reliance on Carol Klas's
representations as to the three alleged appraisals excused their
failure to obtain additional appraisals of the subject property
prior to executing the Agreement. Specifically, defendants
contend, and the trial court found, that defendants' mistaken
belief that the lowest existing appraisal on the property was
$170,000 was caused by Carol Klas's representations and failure
to have the Kent appraisal provided in a timely manner. We are
not persuaded.
7. In light of our
appraisals to range
consider the $5,000
lowest of the three
difference.
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Defendants had ample opportunity, if materially concerned
about the value at which the property would appraise, to have the
property appraised during the two-week time period between the
time of their initial inspection of the property and the time
they executed the agreement. The record indicates that, during
this two-week period, defendants saw fit to have architects,
decorators, and electricians examine the property. Yet, they did
not engage an appraiser to assess the value of the home until
they attempted to obtain financing after executing the Agreement.
Furthermore, we find it unreasonable, especially given Mark Van
Wagoner's professional training and experience in real estate
law, for defendants to have failed to obtain an independent
appraisal prior to executing the Agreement, or to have
conditioned the obligation to purchase on the property appraising
at a particular level, jLf they were truly concerned about the
property's appraised value. Because defendants failed to conduct
a reasonable investigation of the subject property's market value
prior to executing the Agreement, defendants' conduct did not
rise to the level of ordinary diligence required to establish
unilateral mistake.
Accordingly, because defendants failed to fulfill two of the
four elements necessary to justify rescission on the basis of
unilateral mistake, the trial court erred in concluding that
defendants were entitled to rescission of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement on the basis of unilateral mistake.8 See, e.g., John
Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1209-10
(Utah 1987) (absent showing that enforcement of sewer
construction project contract would be unconscionable, that city
had exercised due care in executing contract, and that rescission
of contract would not seriously prejudice engineer, contract
would not be rescinded on grounds of unilateral mistake); Davis
v. Mulholland. 475 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah 1970) (remedy of
rescission on basis of unilateral mistake improper where any

8. Not every unilateral mistake entitles the buyer to relief.
We note that even if defendants' misunderstanding of Carol Klas's
representations did amount to unilateral mistake, the facts
suggest that defendants bore the risk of mistake as to the value
of the subject property. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 154 (1981) explains that a party bears the risk of mistake when
"(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has
only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the
mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient."
Defendants were aware, upon entering into the Agreement, that
they had only "limited knowledge" with respect to the value of
the home.
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mistake on plaintiff's part was due entirely to plaintiff's own
negligence).9
Accordingly, we hold that the parties executed a valid
contract, influenced by no legally cognizable unilateral mistake
on the part of defendants. This agreement bound defendants to
purchase the subject property, with "no exceptions." In refusing
to consummate the sale, defendants materially breached the
Agreement, thereby entitling plaintiff to recover damages.
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES
In its final judgment, the trial court did not address the
issue of damages because of its ruling based on unilateral
mistake. In the trial court's Memorandum Decision of May 30,
1989, however, the court ruled that plaintiff's damages should be
limited to $7,500. However, the trial court did not specify how
it arrived at this figure. "The measure of damages for breach of
contract for the conveyance of land is the difference between the
contract price and the market value at the time of the breach."
Terrv v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981). See D. Dobbs,
Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.11 at 853 (1973).
In the instant case, defendants offered to pay $175,000 for
the subject property in August of 1987. When defendants failed
to consummate the purchase of the property, plaintiff placed the
property for sale on the open market, and on April 13, 1988, sold
the property for $160,000, a figure well above the value stated
9. In light of our determination that defendants' conduct did
not rise to the level of ordinary diligence, it follows that the
trial court correctly dismissed defendants' counterclaim for
fraud and misrepresentation. "Fraud as related to purchase of
real estate may not be predicated on alleged fatlse statements the
truth of which could have been ascertained with reasonable
diligence by the party asserting their falsity," Sokolosky v.
Tulsa Orthopaedic, Inc. Pension Trust, 566 P.2d 429, 431 (Okl.
1977) (quoting Onstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291, 293 (Okl.
1966)). Defendants could have ascertained with reasonable
diligence the truth or falsity of Carol Klas's alleged
misrepresentations by requesting copies of the appraisals, or
demanding to know the basis for her information, or by obtaining
an independent appraisal of the subject property prior to
executing the agreement. Since the means of knowledge were
available to defendants and since they failed to avail themselves
of these means, they cannot now claim to have been deceived by
the representations of the vendor. See Sokolosky, 566 P.2d at
431.
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in defendants' appraisal. The trial court found that $160,000
was the "highest and best price available in the market place" at
the time of the sale. However, the trial court's findings do not
specifically address whether this price represented the market
value of the property at the time defendants breached the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement, which was some seven months prior to the
sale. The trial court made no finding as to the market value of
the property at the time of defendants' breach. Plaintiff is
entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and
the market value of the property at the time of the breach.
ATTORNEY FEES
In its first Memorandum Decision of May 30, 1989, the trial
court concluded that defendants breached the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement, and that plaintiff was entitled to damages and
interest, costs, and attorney fees. In August of 1989, the
parties entered a Stipulation allowing the court to assess
attorney fees in the sum of $6,250 against defendants "should the
trial court's award of attorney's fees be sustained or otherwise
upheld on appeal." However, after a period of almost one year of
objections, motions for new trial, and new proposed Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment by both sides, the trial court entered
its Amended Judgment of July 3, 1990, allowing defendants to
rescind the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on the basis of
unilateral mistake. Accordingly, in its July 3, 1990 Amended
Judgment, the trial court awarded no attorney fees. We reverse
the lower court's final Amended Judgment on the issue of
unilateral mistake. We conclude, as did the trial court in its
first Memorandum Decision, that defendants breached the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to
attorney fees as specified in the stipulation as well as
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. See e.g..
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406, 40809 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment allowing defendants to rescind
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on the basis of unilateral
mistake is reversed. We remand to the trial court with
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instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff, to fix
appropriate damages, and to award plaintiff attorney fees
consistent with thJLs decision.

Gregory^K. Orme, Judge

WECONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN H. KLAS,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

CIVIL NO,

C-88-3192

MARK 0 . VAN WAGONER and
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on
the

regularly

Court

on

May

12, 1989.

The

plaintiff

submitted
was

represented by his counsel, Brant H. Wall, and

and

trial to

bench, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding on May 9 and

10, 1989, with final argument being made and

were

for

to the

present

the

and

defendants

present and represented by their counsel, Lewis D. Stevens
Craig

testified,

W.

Anderson.

evidence

arguments, the matter
decision.

The

and having duly
pleadings,

Court

Witnesses

introduced,
was

duly

were

and

duly

sworn

and

upon submission of final

submitted

to

the

Court

for

having taken the matter under advisement

considered

all

of

the evidence,

testimony,

stipulations, arguments, and other matters presented

in the course of said trial, and being

thus

fully

advised

in
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the

premises,
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Court

made

and

Decision on the 30th day of

May,

1989, and

plaintiff

the

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

having

its

Memorandum

counsel

for

having

Judgment,

thereafter

and

counsel

for

Motion

Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for a New

Trial;

the

plaintiff

Objections
filed

a

and

to

Motion

responded

having

to

plaintiff's

proposed

for
to

thereafter

responded

New

the

response

Findings

Trial,

and

to

the

of Fact, Conclusions of Lav/,
the

plaintiff

thereafter

defendants7 Reply to plaintiff's Response to
the

Court

reviewed all of the pleadings and Memoranda filed by the

parties in support of their respective positions, and the
having

made

and

plaintiff

to

prepare

and

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in
the

Court

Court

entered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision,

dated the 4th day of November, 1989, and directing
the

said

defendant's

Objections to proposed Findings and Conclusions, and
having

to

Motion for New Trial, and the defendants having

reply

Objections
and

the

filed Objections to the proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with a
to

the

thereafter prepared and submitted Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
defendants

entered

thereafter

having

submit

Findings

conformity

amended

for

of Fact,

therewith,

paragraph

Findings of Fact, which does not alter the

counsel

13

Conclusions

of

and
the

of Lav/

or Judgment, the Court now makes and enters the following:
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FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The

property

which is the subject of this action is a

parcel of real estate located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt

Lake

City, Utah.
2.

At all times

plaintiff

John

H.

relevant
Klas

was

to

the

the

issues

involved,

the

owner in fee simple of said

property.
3.

In

late

July

or

early

August,

1987, the

subject

property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a
of

Divorce

in

Civil

No.

Decree

D-86-1705, in the District Court of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
4.

Pursuant

Divorce,

the

undertook

the

to

former

the provisions of the aforesaid Decree of
wife

marketing

of

the

plaintiff,

Carol

Klas,-

of the property and said property was

not listed with a real estate broker-

The

plaintiff

John H.

Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property.
5.
Kent

In 1986, plaintiff
(the

Kent

appraisal)

acquired
for

appraisal showed a market value of
of

the

sale

of

an

appraisal

by

Devere

mortgage loan purposes. That
$165,000.

In

anticipation

said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal
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acquaintances, engaged in real estate practice, provide
appraisals

on the current value of the property which were oral

in nature, and used by plaintiff as
the

opinion

market

value

for

sale

of

a

basis

the

for

property.

establishing
Said opinion

appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000,
6.

In

late

inspected the

July

or

early

property

in

the

August, 1987, the defendants
presence

of

Carol

Klas

and

expressed an interest in acquiring the property.
7.

In the course of defendants' contact with

prior

to

August

11,

Carol

1987, references were made to the effect

that she understood "appraisals11 had been made in the
$175,000

to

$192,000,

Klas,

which

defendants

v/ritten nature, however, there is a

believed

dispute

whether

range

of

to be of a
plaintiff

or Carol Klas represented that "written11 appraisals existed.
8.

On or about August 7,

Wagoner,

who

1987,

the

defendant

Van

is an attorney, prepared and delivered an Earnest

Money Sales Agreement to Carol Klas, dated August 7,
bearing

the

by

parties.

the

Mark

date

1987,

and

of August 11, 1987, as the date of signature
Said

agreement

was

not

based

upon

any

misrepresentation by plaintiff or Carol Klas.
9.
John

Carol Klas presented the offer to her
H.

Klas.

former

husband,

who accepted the same on August 11, 1987, and a
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parties

and

the

15,

premises

1987
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was

agreed

The sales price for the premises was

v/as

lowest

price

by

the

were vacated in anticipation of the

closing.
the

upon

of

the

$175,000, which

opinion appraisals provided by

Carol Klas.
10.

Plaintiff

and

defendants

executed

the Earnest Money

Sales Agreement on August 11, 1987.
11.

The

integrated

clause

contained in the Earnest Money

Sales Agreement, dated August 7, 1987, brings
the

understandings

together

all

of

and agreements of the parties and there can

be no variance except by mutual agreement of the parties.
12.

At

no

time

on

or

prior to August 11, 1987, did the

plaintiff engage in any discussion with the defendants
to

the subject transaction and at no time on or prior to August

11, 1987 was any request made by
for

relative

the

production

of

an

defendants

to

plaintiff

appraisal of the property, except,

however, pursuant to paragraph 4
directly

the

above,

defendants

negotiated

with Carol Klas and asked her to obtain an "appraisal11

and she requested the same from plaintiff.
13.

A

series

of

negotiations

intervened,

and

what was

understood by the defendants as a counter offer was made to
defendants

through

Mr.

failed to meet the closing

Cowley,
date

after
of

the

which

the

defendants

September

15,

1987, and
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plaintiff that they did not intend to

consummate the purchase of the property.
14.

The

plaintiff

then

estate broker on or about

listed

September

the

property with a real

29,

1987, at

an

asking

price of $174,500.
15.
their

On or about October 2,
counsel

gave

formal

the withdrawal of their
demanded

1987, the

defendants

through

written notice to the plaintiff of

offer

to

purchase

the

property

and

the return of the earnest money deposit, which earnest

money deposit

was

thereafter

refunded

and

returned

to

the

defendants.
16.

In

approximately

defendants

notice

that

mid-October,
if

they

1987, plaintiff

failed

to

consummate

acquisition and purchase of the property within ten
the

property

would

be

placed

on

gave
the

(10) days,

the market in an effort to

mitigate damages and that defendants would

be

responsible

for

any damages sustained.
17.

The defendants failed to

the

property

and

the

earnest

money

defendants

were

consummate

the

purchase

of

on December 15, 1987, the plaintiff returned
deposit

further

of

$1,000,

notified

by

at

which

time

the

plaintiff that he would

look to said defendants for any damages, if such should occur.
18.

The

property

was

placed

for sale in the open market

for a period of several months during which

period

of

time a
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effort

fide

and

diligent
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was made to locate a buyer or

otherwise sell the property at its fair market
April

13,

value,

and

on

1988,. said property was sold to one David B. Boyce,

at a price of $160,000, which was

then

the

highest

and

best

price available in the market place.
19.
v/ere

Defendants were unaware of

under

"Kent" appraisal

and

the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by

Carol Klas was
"Kent11

the

the

lowest

appraisal

on the

property.

"The

appraisal, if known to the defendants, would have made a

material difference in their offer to buy the subject property.
20.

At

notice

no

that

time

the

representations

did

the

defendants

made

by

plaintiff have any knowledge or

were

Carol

relying

Klas

and

on
at

any

no time did the

plaintiff make any representation relative to the
value

of

the

fair

Sales

dated

11,

Agreement
1987.

submitted

However,

by

the defendants,

defendants negotiated with

plaintiff through Carol Klas pursuant to paragraph 4
pursuant

to

market

property other than by signing and accepting the

Earnest Money
August

alleged

plaintiff

above

and

and Carol Klas' understanding the range

would be the property value of the three highest "appraisals."
21.

The

defendants

did

not rely upon any representations

made by the plaintiff pertaining to the

fair market

value

of

KLAS V. VAN WAGONER

the

subject
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property prior to the execution and signing of the

Earnest Money Agreement,
plaintiff's

dated

attorney,

August

James

11,

P.

1987,

Cowley,

handled
except

representations made by Carol Klas, and the first contact
occurred

between

the

plaintiff

execution of the Earnest Money

by
for

which

and the defendants was on the

Sales

Agreement

which

was

on

August 17, 1987.
22.
the

Although the defendants had opportunity to

issue

of

fair

market

value

execution of the Earnest Money
1987,

they

continued

of

Sales

the

investigate

property

Agreement

of

prior to
August

7,

to rely upon the existence of appraisals

as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market value

of

the

would

not

property.
23.
approve

The
of

defendants
any

knew

that

"conditions"1

or

the

plaintiff

"exceptions"

to the Earnest

Money Sales Agreement at the time of its execution and
to

the

plaintiff

and

were

advised

that

purchase the property, the purchase would
basis

that

there

were

no

delivery

if they desired to

have

contingencies,

to .be

on

exceptions,

conditions of sale other than as set forth in the Earnest

the
or

Money

Sales Agreement.
24.
purchase

The
the

Earnest

Money

Sales

Agreement

and

offer

to

subject property at a price of $175,000 was among
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not

make

any

fraudulent

representations or misrepresentations relative to the terms

and

provisions

The

of

defendants,

the

sale

however,

and

were

purchase

of

the property.

negotiating

on

the

understanding

there were appraisals and the appraisals were in writing,
29.

The market pertaining to the value of the

question

diminished

or

softened

between

the

contract of August, 1987, and the sale of the

property

in

date

of

the

property

by

the

plaintiff in April, 1988.
30.
and

In the course of negotiations

between

the

defendants

Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing

the property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown
defendants,
in their

and 'if known, would have made a material difference

offer

unilateral

to

mistake

buy

subject
part

fundamental and substantial.

The

provided

by

on

the
the

never

Carol

for copies of appraisals.
find

to

any

fraud

or

property.

of

This

was a

the defendants which was

Devere

Kent

appraisal

was

Klas in spite of defendants7 request
In this regard, the

misrepresentation

on

Court
the

does

part

of

not
the

plaintiff.
31.

The

defendants

considered

the

being a reasonable price for the property
time

the

price
in

of $175,000 as

question

at

the

offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them,
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5*

The plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

6.

The Earnest Money Agreement is rescinded

and

is void

and of no force or effect.
7.

The defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed,

8.

Each

party

is

to bear his own attorney's fees, costs

and expenses of litigation.
Dated thisry — day of May, 1990.

RAYMOND S. UNO v
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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EXHIBIT C

Wlvtt

f :) I I OVJJ.

•

annota'I

'

K

' l| '

,

• Ml

O>JI<

•

Amended Findings of Fact which support the trial court's
ruling :::>n unilateral mistake and rescission.
appear

The paragraphs
court•s Amended

Findings of Fact.

Tii i s annotation

intended tun he an exhaustive

summary of the evidence which supports all (if the tiia!
court's findings
relate

•

.,, ^

listed belov
fact" •

*!" JC!" '

Oi ill j th ::: 5€ f.1 ml 1 m i s ml I iii I ' t In 111 Hi

unilateral mistake and rescission are

ndeed, some portions of particular findings of
•

he se j: or t:i ::: 11: 1 5 ar • = i r 1: ell e /a n t 1::. ::: I h •»

court's ruling on unilateral mistake.

These annotations

simply indicate that there was sufficient testimony given

;>1 fact ,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FAC I"

relevant

*

aes involved, the
simple n«l sa ,1 c;i

property.
Testimony of John H. Klasi "Q. In the decree c f
divorce, as granted were you awarded that home as
your sole and separate property? A. Yes I w a s "
(Transcript, Vol. I # at p.7, 1.8-11).

1

3.

In late July or early August, 1987, the subject

property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a
decree of divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Testimony of John H. Klas: "Q. When did you first,
to the best of your knowledge, have an occasion to
talk to Carol about your intention to sell the home
or what you expected to get out of it? A. It was
either June or July of 1987." (Transcript, Vol. I,
at p.18, 1.5-9).
H

Q. Well, this is what Ifm — did there come a
point in time when you had a conversation with her
and told her it was your desire that the home be
exposed to the market and sold? A. There is no
question about that.
That was understood right
from the beginning. Q. But did you tell her that?
A. Yes I did. Q. Would this have been around
June/July time frame of 1987? A. Yes, I would say
June of 1987.11 (Transcript, Vol. I, at p. 19, 1.1825, p.20, 1.1-3.)
Testimony of Carol Klas: ffQ.
In approximately
when did the election or the determination come
about when he decided the home would be put on the
market? A. I believe it would have been following
the decree of divorce, because I had to make plans
at that time whether to move out, find a job, and
so we talked about this issue of remaining in the
home and being there. Because he had already moved
out and th€>re would be someone there to show the
home. So, it would have been I would say June,
after the middle of June.11 (Transcript, Vol. II,
at p.82, 1.25, p.83, 1.1-9).

4.

Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree

of Divorce, the former wife of the plaintiff, Carol Klas,
undertook the marketing of the property and said property was
not listed with a real estate broker.

The plaintiff John H.

Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property.

2

Testimony of John Klas. iHeie John HI i reads a
portion of his divorce decree]
"A
If the
defendant, prior to September 1, 1987, finds a
buyer who is willing and able and ready to purchase
the Berkley Street property at a price and upon
terms acceptable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
shall pay to the defendant as a one - time finders
fee for her services In showing the house and
finding a buyer a sum equivalent to 3% of the gross
sale price of the residence.tf (Transcript, Vol. I,
at p.8, 1.2-11)«
After this c o n v e r s a tion occurred, do you know
m^m
what then transpired or happened from the
standpoint of marketing the property? A. Well, I
was aware of the fact because I drove past the home
on occasion, that there was a sign in front of the
yard that the home was for sale. I was aware of
the fact that she contemplated having open houses
in the home because she had told me that she
intended to do that. I was aware of the fact that
she intended to advertise the home because I saw
the ads in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret
News advertising the home," fTranscript, Vol. T
at p.20, 1.17-25, p.21, 1 II Ij
Testimony of Carol Klas:
"Q.
And during that
period of time, did you undertake to find a buyer
for the home that you were residing in on Berkley
Street, which is the subject of this litigation?
A,
That is correct.11
(Transcript, Vol, TT, at
p.81, 1.6-10).
"A. He gave me some guidelines to follow. We drew
up an ad. I primarily wrote the ad. He reviewed
it and said it would be acceptable to him, And it
was placed in the Salt Lake in something called the
newspaper agency which incorporates the Deseret and
Salt Lake Tribune." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.83,
1.16-21).
f,

Q. Did you do anything other than put the ad in
the paper? Did you conduct an open house or make
any effort that way? A. I believe, if I recall my
memory, the Sunday indicated open house. I don't
remember having an open house on Saturdays, but I
did it primarily on the weekend. Yes, and I felt
the response was very good, particularly by owner.
. . , Q. When is the first open house that you
can recall that was conducted in connection with
the ad that was placed in the paper? A. About the
j

18th of July."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.84,
1.25, p.85, 1.1-7, 1.13-16).
5«

In 1986, plaintiff acquired an appraisal by Devere

Kent (the Kent appraisal) for mortgage loan purposes.

That

appraisal showed a market value of $165,000. In anticipation
of the sale of said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal
acquaintances,

engaged

in real

estate

practice, provide

opinion appraisals on the current value of the property which
were oral in nature, and used by plaintiff as a basis for
establishing the market value for sale of the property. Said
opinion appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000.
M
Testimony of John Klas:
A.
Mr. Kent is an
appraiser who lives in Kerns, Utah. And what his
qualifications are I am not familiar with.
He
apparently does work for Chase Manhattan Bank.
Carol and I were in the process of applying for a
second mortgage loan on the home prior to our
divorce and Chase Manhattan Bank had asked him to
make an appraisal for the home on it.
Because
banks are extremely conservative in their lending
policies and they want to make sure that the value
is reflected to secure the loan that they are
making. And he was placed to make the appraisal at
the suggestion of Chase Manhattan Bank. Q. Now,
that was in connection with this financing that you
and your then wife, Carol, contemplated?
A.
Thatfs true." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.32, 1.1825, p.33, 1.1-10).
M
Testimony of Carol Klas:
Q.
In the Chase
Manhattan item we referred to, was that an effort
to maintain separate financing on the home through
Chase Manhattan? A. That would have been in 86.
Q. That was the efforts; you were going to obtain
some separate mortgage? A. Yes, to pay off some
loans.
Q.
And an appraisal was performed in
connection with that effort? A. Yes. I was not
aware of it at the time because the property was in
my name and John just asked me to come in and sign.
So, I was not aware of the appraisal until some
time later. Q. Sometime later after what? A.
Uhm, perhaps when John and I were discussing what

4

he would enter as a consideration."
Vol. II, at p.130, 1.8-23).

(Transcript,

Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner:
"A.
And the
next question I asked was: f How much is the house? 1
and she, right then said, f We don't have a firm
asking price. 1
And I said, ''Do you have any
appraisals? 1 was my next question. And she said,
•Yes. They range from $175 to somewhere in the low
$190's. f And during that conversation, she told me
about where the three came from. She did not tell
me which one was which. She just mentioned 'One is
from
American
Savings; that's where John
is
employed. Vick Ayers has given us another one. He
is a good friend of Johns. f
He is with Gump &
Ayers so 1 knew his name. I knew he was well known
in real estate.
And then the third name she
mentioned was Mr. Howard Badger, who was a neighbor
on Berkley Street who had been a principle of
Badger/Jensen Reality for years. So, I knew those
three names from that conversation that Saturday
night,
Q.
Did
you
specifically
ask
for
appraisals?
A.
Yes.
Q
You have no doubt in
your mind about that? A. No.ff
(Transcript, Vol.
II, at p.148, 1.15-25, p.149, 1.1-12).

6.

T

inspected

-

1

~ a " ------ —

the property

H x|; ressn' I

early August, 1987, the defendants
in

- - * presence

of

carol Klas

and

I' 11 yfa 1 ut - • ,,. *. . nij t, tie property.

Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: M Q. And did she
reveal anything else to you as a result of that
initial conversation?
A.
Well, she said that
Carol would be in the house the next day and that
we could go over and look at the house and talk to
her some more about it.
Q.
Did you go over and
look at the house?
A- We did,
Q. And how long
did you spend looking at the home and inspecting
it? A. Well, overall we spent a lot of time. On
the next day, 1 think we spent a good deal of
time."
(Transcript, Vol . T
at p 93 , 3 19-25,
P.94,
-4).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; f,A. Well before
the conversation ended, I asked her if we could
comci and see the house. Q. And did you schedule
an appointment? A. Yes for the next day. Q. Did
you go to the house on the next day? A. Yes, Q.

5

What did you do? A. We went through it. And we
liked it* I had never been inside. That was the
first time I had been inside, From the outside, we
had always admired the house. It was attractive
and it was always well maintained. And I think we,
what we were looking for initially, it was just to
see if it would work. Q. On the visit — when did
this visit to the house occur, as best you recall?
A. It was a Sunday and it was in the afternoon. I
believe that the time that Carol said was probably
right. I have no recollection of the exact time.
It was not dark, though. It was not dusky; it was
afternoon. It was a nice, summer afternoon. Q.
Was this on the weekend of the 24th holiday? A.
Yes, it was, the Sunday after the July 24th
holiday." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.16-25,
p.150, 1.1-15).
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. Alright, and tell
the court, if you will, the first date that you can
recall that the Van Wagoners contacted you with
reference to the subject property? A. The 25th, I
believe. It would have been a Saturday. Q. Of
July? A. Of July. Q. Of 1987? A. That is
correct.
Q.
And how did you recall that
particular date? Is there some way that you can
tie it to that? A. Because it was the day before
my open house on the 26th. And they specifically
asked if they could come over prior to the time. I
think it was listed at 1:30 or 2:00 and they asked
if they could come over before. And I agreed.11
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.8(5, 1.7-23).

7.

In the course of defendants1 contact with Carol

Klas, prior to August 11, 1987, references were made to the
effect that she understood "appraisals" had been made in the
range of $175,000 to $192,000, which defendants believed to be
of a written nature, however, there is a dispute whether
plaintiff or Carol Klas represented that "written11 appraisals
existed.
Testimony of Mark O. Van Wagoner: "A. Well, I
asked Kathryn if they had no price, how could we
know whether we could be interested in the house?
6

And she told me that in the conversation with Carol
Klas that she had suggested that their was a range
of market values set by three appraisals of the
property and that some offer in that range of
market value would be acceptable. Q. Did she tell
you what the range was? A. Yes. The range was
from --my recollection is the range was from $170
to the mid $190fs,M (Transcript, Vol I, at p.93,
1.9-18).
"We then asked her what the asking price was 1 i
the house. And she told us that she didn't have a
definite asking price; that it had just gone on the
market; that she was marketing the house pursuant
to the decree of divorce; and that she had three
appraisals on the property that ranged in value
from $170,000 to $190,000 -- one or three or
something, but it was above $190, but just a little
above $190. She told me and Kathryn, she explained
that Mr. Klas had told her that he would not take
anything outside of that range and that he was
looking for a very substantial offer. We talked
again about the appraisals. And I'll tell you, I
do not recall whether it was at that time that she
said that Mr. Klas had them and that she didn't.
But we discussed the values and were they current
and that sort of thing. She said, yes, that they
were all available and that's why that she felt
good about this range of price." (Transcript, Vol.
T at p.181, 1.19-2S, p.18?, 1,1-12).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; "A. And
said,
'Do you have any appraisals?'
Was my next
question. And she said, 'Yes, they range from $175
to somewhere in the low $190's." (Transcript, Vol.
TT, it p 148, 1 ,19-21).
Testimony of Carol Klas: flA. Then I believe Mr.
Van Wagoner said to me, 'How did Mr. Klas arrive at
the price of $180,000? How did he arrive at that?'
And I mentioned to him at the time, since I was
involved in a decorative more of a facilitator
way, I did not know a great deal about the
background of how he arrived at this, but I could
share with him what John had told me
y
Just
tell us what you told the Van Wagoners in response
to their inquiry? A. To their inquiry about how
we arrived at this, \i
Yes. A, And I mentioned
that Mr. Payne of American Savings and Loan had
seen the home a year before and had drawn up some
type of letter and had given this to Mr. Klas. And
the provisions of that letter were one page. T had
7

indicated a year before we had applied for a loan,
and I was aware there was something to qualify for
a loan; that you had to have some kind of
appraisal. So, I was aware there was something
there but I was very vague on it, I thought that
would be from Chase Manhattan Bank. Howard Badger
had given an opinion to John, which John had shared
with me. Vick Ayers had given an opinion to John.
He had been through the home. And I believe there
was one other opinion that had been raised, plus
the fact that — I just canft recall.
I think
there was one other opinion - Vick Ayers and Howard
Badger. I believe those were the main ones. And
they had all come up. And I believe I said at that
time, fMr. Klas is looking at a range from about
$170 up to $190 or a little over $190."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.90, 1.4-25, p.91, 1.116) .

9.

Carol

Klas presented

the

offer

to her

former

husband, John H. Klas, who accepted the same on August 11,
1987, and a closing date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon
by the parties and the premises were vaicated in anticipation
of the closing.

The sales price

for the premises was

$175,000, which was the lowest price of the opinion appraisals
provided by Carol Klas.
Testimony of John Klas: "A. Yfes. And in early
August, approximately August 7th of 1987, Carol
brought an earnest money agreement signed by Mark
Van Wagoner & Kathryn Van Wagoner to me at my
office." (Transcript, Vol. I. at p.21, 1.14-17).
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. And did you then, in
fact, take the document to his office downtown? A.
I did at American Savings. Q. And did you deliver
it to him? A. I did." (Transcript, Vol. II, at
p.98, 1.20-24).

19.

Defendants were unaware of the "Kent" appraisal and

were under the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by
8

Carol Klas was the lowest appraisal on * :-><- property
"Kent" appraisal, if known, to the defe-^i ^" •»!ii,:ie

c

i 'in t h e i r

offer

The
ma i*t

.

to

subject

property.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "A. I said,
•The appraisal had come back at $137,000 I need
your appraisals.1 Q. What did Mr. Klas respond?
A. He said, 'I'll get them.1 Q. What happened
then? A. About thirty minutes later, Mr. Klas
came into my office. Q. And what happened? A,
He had in his hand an appraisal by Devere Kent made
in 1986. He handed it to me and said, 'Here; this
ought to help, ' Q. When was the first time yon
saw the Kent appraisal? A. That very moment.11
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.42, 1.1-14).
Testimony of Kathryn Van wagoner: lfQ. Mrs. Van
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August who
obtained the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't you? A. I thought they existed. I
had no reason to doubt that there were no
appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that there
were. And I knew that we would get them. I knew
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard
time reaching him one weekend when she needed to.
She said, 'He must have gone out of town.' He
didn't tell her, but she said, 'I can't find him; I
can't find him.' I thought that when it came down
to us, we will give him the $1,000. We will make
this offer and we would get all the papers that we
needed. We needed an appraisal; I knew that, to
justify where we were going to be and to go to the
bank and proceed with the transaction. I knew what
we needed.,f
(Transcript, Vol, II, at p. 162, 1.321) .

?"

Howevei

defendants

througV nar^', Fl^s pursuant
- *

negotiated
•

-

with

plaintiff

IVM .in.11 \

' understanding the range would i *

-i.e. property value of t: . three highest "appraisals."

9

Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: MQ. And did she
reveal anything else to you as a result of that
initial conversation?
A.
Well, she said that
Carol would be in the house the next day and that
we could go over and look at the house and talk to
her some more about it." (Transcript, Vol.1 at
p.93, 1.19-23) .
"Q. Is there any doubt in your mind but what at
the time the document was signed by you and your
wife that the sum of $175f000 was disclosed as the
sales price?
A.
Yes, it was disclosed as the
price that Carol told me John would accept if I
offered it to him." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98,
1.10-15).
"A. Carol Klas told me — and I donft know that
this is true — that John was a very difficult
person; that he would not look kindly on an
exception. That if we wanted to get the house —
and she knew I wanted it — that I would have to
let her show me and lead me through how to get it;
and that there could be no condition, exceptions or
other kinds of things written into the earnest
money." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.101, 1.18-25).
"Q. So, when you were dealing with her, there was
no doubt in your mind but what Mr. Klas was the
owner of the property. A. No." (Transcript, Vol.
I, at p.103, 1.23-25, p.104, 1.1).

12. Although

the

defendants

had

opportunity

to

investigate the issue of fair market value of the property
prior to execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of
August 7, 1987, they continued to rely upon the existence of
appraisals as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market
value of the property.
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q.
Why didnft you question Mark? A. I thought they
existed. I had no reason to doubt that there were
no appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that
10

there were. And I knew we would get them. _
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard
time reaching one weekend when she needed to. She
said, he must have gone out of town. He didn't
tell her, 1 but she said, f I can f t find him; I can't
find him.
I thought when it came down to us, we
will give him the $1,000. We will make this offer
and we would get all the papers that we needed. We
needed an appraisal; I knew that to justify where
we were going to be and go to the bank and proceed
with the transaction,
1 knew what we needed.11
(Transcript, Vol, II,, at ][::; 1 62, ] 3-21) ,

2 8.

The de fendant *
uere we

however

i »«r °

ippraisals and -

ri

egot iat ing on the

appraisals were in

writing.
Testimony of 'Mark 0. Van wagoner; lfQ. I take -it
from what I have heard in your counsels opening
statement and other comments, that it is your claim
or contention that there was some representation
about the existence of appraisals as being fa
relevantfi factor in this case, correct? A. That s
correct.
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p, 101, 1 3-8).
""A. Well, we had some truncated conversations in
which I told Mr. Klas that I had to have the
appraisals that I had been told existed."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.43, J .8-3 0),

• •••. • ' 3 0 . ' '

I

and Carol

it'se of

!

in qirit i ,it, n iriis

material
property

I

i n e aet

efiiiiai'ii,!1:'.

there existed the Devere Kent appraisal

valuing the property at $165,000,
u n k x i n wi i

fcwi.ween

ileJ;etidanl

difference

« nI

->x si*enr«- •>• which was

i il

their offer

subject

unilateral mistake
. ~„r

d

the part of the
rhe Devere

Kent appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of
II 1

defendants1 request for copies of appraisals• In this regard,
the Court does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the
part of the plaintiff*
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner;
"Q. Mr. Van
Wagoner, if you will recall before the lunch hour,
we were discussing a telephone conversation between
you and Mr. Cowley on September 23, 1987; do you
recall that? A. Yes. Q. After that telephone
call on September 23rd, what was the next thing
that happened with regard to the Berkley property?
A. Well, I told Kathryn about the $161 offer. And
we talked about whether it would be possible to do
that in view of the fact that there was an
appraisal for $137."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at
p.70, 1.21-25, p.71, 1.1-7)•
n

A. Well, I decided that based on what Mr. Dimmick
had told me that it would not be possible to use
the $161 figure as a basis, and that I would need
to use the $137 as a basis." (Transcript, Vol. II,
at p.72, 1.4-7).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: MQ. Did you
specifically ask for appraisals? A. Yes. Q. You
have no doubt in your mind about that? A. No.11
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.9-12).

31.

The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as

being a reasonable price for the property in question at the
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them,
based on representations made by Carol Klas and without the
benefit of the Devere Kent appraisal.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner; ffQ. Is there
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the
document was signed by you and your wife that the
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price?
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol
told me John would accept if I offered it to him."
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 1.10-15).

12

32
IIIII

The defendants made no attempt t o s e c u r e appraisals
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Rarnest

Money

S a l e s Agreement was entered i n t o by the p a r t i e s , because of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made by Carol Klas, there were "appraisals" in
IP * i s l em e.

Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. Is there
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the
document was signed by you and your wife that the
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price?
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol
told me John would accept if I offered it to him."
(Transcript, Vol. I at: p 98 ] 10-15) .
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q.
Why didn't you? A. 1 thought they existed. I had
no reason to doubt that there were no appraisals.
I had no reason.
I believe that there were."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.162, ] 3-10).
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